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Abstract
Terrorism seems to be accepted as a grave act of international concern, but has not yet been accommodated 
explicitly in the International Criminal Court (ICC). This article explores the prospect of including terrorism 
under the crime of aggression in cases transcending boundaries, by examining whether terrorism can fit 
into its’ elements. While terrorism can be conducted by state and non-state actors, it will be shown that it 
is possible for states committing terrorism to have their officials prosecuted for the crime of aggression. 
For the more infamous terrorism by non-state actors, however, do not seem to satisfy the required elements.
Keywords: crime of aggression, terrorism, rome statute.
Intisari
Terorisme sudah diterima sebagai kejahatan yang menjadi perhatian internasional, tetapi belum 
diakomodasi secara eksplisit dalam hukum pidana internasional melalui Mahkamah Pidana Internasional 
(ICC). Artikel ini akan mengamati kemungkinan memasukkan terorisme dalam tindak pidana agresi, 
terutama dalam kasus terorisme yang melampaui batas-batas Negara. Artikel ini akan mengamati konsep 
tindak pidana agresi dalam Statuta Roma, dan melihat apakah terorisme dapat memenuhi unsur-unsurnya. 
Ternyata walaupun terorisme oleh actor non-negara lebih terkenal, tapi konsep terorisme dapat memuat 
terorisme oleh Negara juga. Akan dijelaskan bagaimana kejahatan agresi bisa jadi dikenakan pada 
terorisme oleh Negara, tetapi justru tidak pada terorisme oleh aktor non-negara.
Kata Kunci: tindak pidana agresi, terorisme, statuta roma.
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A. Introduction 
Terrorism has been a threat to the international 
world for quite a while, and has become a new 
phenomenon. The 9/11 incident was even declared 
as a breach to international peace through UN 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions No. 1368 
and 1373 (2011). However, the crime of terrorism 
has yet to find its way in international criminal law 
instruments. As one can observe in Article 5-8bis 
of the Rome Statute (ICCSt), there is no apparent 
reference to acts of terrorism. Does this mean 
that terrorism exists in a vacuum in international 
criminal law?
The legal problem discussed in this essay is: 
can the acts of terrorism classify under the crime 
of aggression under Article 8bis of the ICCSt? To 
answer this legal problem, one must first clarify the 
concept of “aggression” and “terrorism”. From such 
clarification, it will be found that there can be two 
types of possible perpetrator of terrorism i.e. state 
and non-state actors. This will beg another legal 
problem: what are the consequences of difference 
in character of each type of perpetrator according 
to the ICCSt provisions regarding the Crime of 
Aggression? This essay will discuss the prospects 
and problems in prosecuting both types of terrorism 
before the ICC.
B. Discussion
1. “Aggression” and “Terrorists”?
a. The Crime of Aggression
An ‘act of aggression’ is defined in 
Article 8bis(2) of ICCSt as “[…] the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations”. The Crime of Aggression itself 
in Article 8bis (1) essentially contains three 
conjunctive elements: (a) the involvement of 
the defendant towards that act of aggression, 
(b) the “leadership” requirement, and (c) 
whether the act of aggression is a manifest 
breach of the UN Charter. The Elements of 
Crime of the Crime of Aggression breaks into 
five elements to also incorporate the elements 
of “violation of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and political independence” which 
comes from the definition of the act of 
aggression in Article 8bis(2), and a “mental 
element”.
The crime of aggression is a breach of 
jus ad bellum (legality of the use of force) 
which is separate from the jus in bello (lawful 
conducts of war).1 However, the actual 
relation may seem attached to each other. The 
horrors within the war are aggravating factors 
that consequently come with the starting of a 
war (i.e. aggression).2 Not to mention that not 
all acts of aggression will actually threaten 
international peace and security,3 and it is the 
assessment of inter alia gravity and scale that 
will determine whether the act of aggression 
to be processed in the ICC (as per Article 
8bis(2) of the ICCSt).
b. Terrorists and Terrorism 
It is plain enough to see that a ‘terrorist’ 
is one who commits acts of ‘terrorism’. There 
have been many attempts to define the acts 
of terrorism, which all of them would have 
their own difficulty. It is so much easier to 
point at a certain act as an act of terror once 
we have seen it, but classifying it into a 
legal act would present more difficulties.4 
Numerous instances would easily (popularly) 
be classified as terrorist attacks, e.g. the IRA 
1 Marco Sassoli et al,. 2006, How Does Law Protect in War: Volume I (Outline of International Humanitarian Law) Third Edition, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva,  pp. 14-15.
2 See Paras 2-3 of the Preamble of the ICCSt, see also: M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes”, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, No.4, 1996, p.70.
3 Ibid.
4 Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, “The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism”, New Criminal Law Review: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, August, 2013, p. 495.
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bombing in 1984, the 9/11 Incident in 2001, 
the Bali Bombing in 2002, etc, would easily 
classify as acts of terror.5
As a matter of law, though, there are 
numerous definitions of “terrorism”, both in 
national and as international instruments.6 
No single definition has been universally 
agreed upon,7 but there are two general 
elements that are common to all definitions of 
terrorism, namely: objective element (mainly 
the use of physical violence), and subjective 
element (the intention to create terror and 
fear, or coerce governments/ international 
organisations).8
The aforementioned definition covers 
acts that are not normally be referred to as 
terrorism, e.g. the Iraq invasion (this will 
be explained later).9 However, this may 
generally be the best elements of a definition. 
This essay will use that together with 
examples from incidents that are commonly 
labelled as terrorist acts.
In addition, since the act of aggression 
involves transgressing “[…] sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, or political independence 
[…]”,10 acts of terrorism committed by 
actors within the state’s territory will not be 
analysed.11
In order to answer whether acts of 
terrorism can be classified as a Crime of 
Aggression, the five elements of the crime 
as prescribed in the Elements of Crime 
should be fulfilled. However, there are a few 
elements that will be assumed to be satisfied 
in this essay. 
The element of involvement (planning, 
preparing, initiating, or execution) is assumed 
to be satisfied, as this essay will focus on 
terrorists that are already assumed to be 
directly involved in the actions. The element 
of transgressing sovereignty (together 
with territorial integrity and political 
independence, the three as alternatives) are 
assumed to be satisfied as well, as it has 
been mentioned that this essay will eliminate 
terrorist acts conducted from within a State’s 
territory. The mental element (awareness 
of the transgressing sovereignty) is also 
assumed to be satisfied, because the terrorists 
are assumed to have deliberately planned 
such kind of transgression.
It is the remaining two elements 
that will be shown to have some extent of 
controversy to be explored in this essay: the 
“leadership” requirement, and the ‘manifest 
breach’ test. 
2. The “Leadership” Requirement
Article 8bis of the ICCSt defines the crime of 
aggression as an act of aggression committed “[...] by 
a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State [...]”. This is also the second element of the 
Crime of Aggression in the ICC Elements of Crime.
a. De Jure Control
A simple reading of the aforementioned 
provision would result in a conclusion that 
people who have formal positions in a State, 
with authority to control over the armed 
forces of that State, can commit a crime 
of aggression. One would easily think of 
5 Ibid
6 National: UK Terrorism Act 2000, Indonesian Anti-Terrorism Law No. 15 of 2003, etc, International: European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism (1977), UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution No. 53 (1995), etc
7 Angela Hare, “A New Forum for the Prosecution of Terrorists: Exploring the Possibility of the Addition of Terrorism to the ICCSt’s 
Jurisdiction”, Loyola University Chicago International Law Review. Vol. 8, No.1, 2010, p. 97.
8 Christian Walter, “Defining Terrorism in National and International Law”, in Christian Walters et al, 2004, Terrorism as a Challenge for 
National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? Sprinter, Heidelberg, pp. .42-43.
9 Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, Op.cit., p.501.
10 Article 8bis(2) of the ICCSt.
11 Such as the Bali Bombing by the Indonesian Jamaah Islamiyah, although there may be some links to Al-Qaeda. See also, Muhammad Haniff 
bin Hassan, “Imam Samudra’s Justification for Bali Bombing”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, Iss.12, 2007, pp.1034-1035, 1042-
1043.
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Ayman Al-Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda (AQ), or 
Abu Bakar Baashir of the Jemaah Islamiyah 
when it comes to terrorist leaders. However, 
these names do not exercise any control of 
any military of any states, therefore any of 
their acts cannot easily qualify as an act of 
aggression.
1) Terrorism by State?
Is it, then, possible for a state to 
commit an act of terrorism? In 1992, the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) issued 
Resolution 748 (1992), to demand Libya to 
“[…] commit itself definitively to cease all 
forms of terrorist action […]”. The wording 
suggests that Libya has been committing acts 
of terrorism.
Some legislation may suggest this 
conclusion. The UK Terrorism Act provides 
an “action based” definition of terrorism 
describing acts constituting an act of terror, 
but not specifying who can perpetrate it.12 
This is unlike the Indonesian Anti-Terrorism 
Law No. 15 of 2003 that specifies that only 
persons can commit act of terrorism.13
The Lockerbie incident, labelled as 
an act of terrorism,14 was attributed to Libya 
since UNSC Resolution 731 (1992) and then 
748 (1992). Further, in 2011, the former 
justice minister of Libya mentioned that 
Ghaddafy actually personally ordered the 
act of terrorism in the Lockerbie incident. 
As note: this minister was a defector during 
the civil war, the claim was not investigated, 
and Ghaddafy himself denied giving such 
orders.15 
Assuming for argument sake that 
Ghaddafy actually did gave such orders, this 
is one very straightforward example of a 
person in effective control over a state (and 
its military power), committing an act of 
terrorism. Although, the Lockerbie incident 
does not constitute as an act of aggression 
which requires the aircraft attacked to be a 
military aircraft16 while the Pan Am Air 103 
was a commercial flight.
The invasion to Iraq in 2003 may serve 
as an elusive example of acts of terror in form 
of aggression committed by a State.17 This 
invasion was clearly an act of violence both 
to the sovereignty of Iraq as well as the lives 
and property of the Iraq civilians (satisfying 
the objective element).18 Further, the purpose 
of the invasion was to coerce the Iraq 
government to commit certain acts (in this 
case, allegedly to obey UNSC resolutions 
or to institute democracy, etc, will be further 
explained later), satisfying the subjective 
element.19
The UK was involved in the invasion,20 
while the UK Terrorism Act 2000 mentions 
the same subjective element in Section 
1(1)(b)-(c), while the objective element in 
Section 1(2) is met (serious violence against 
a person or property, endangering a person’s 
life, serious risk to health or safety of the 
public, etc). This might mean that the UK, 
under its’ own law, committed an act of terror 
in the invasion to Iraq.
In a national law regime, one may 
propose to exclude official state’s acts so 
12 Part I Section 1 The UK Terrorism Act.
13 Officiating Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002, see Articles 1(2), 6, and 7.
14 Steven Stottlemyre, “Libya and the International System: Retracing the Aftermath of the Lockerbie Bombing”, Digest of Middle East Studies, 
Vol. 20, No.1, May, 2011, pp.54-55.
15 BBC, “Colonel Gaddafi ‘ordered Lockerbie bombing”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-12552587, accessed on 6 April 
2014.
16 Article 8bis(2)(d) of the ICCSt
17 Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, Op.cit., p.501.
18 BBC, “Iraq War in Figures”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11107739, accessed on 6 April 2014.
19 Mathew Gillet, “The Anatomy of an International Crime of Aggression at the International Criminal Court”, International Criminal Law 
Review,  Vol. 13, No. 4, 2013, pp.848-849.
20 The Telegraph, “Iraqi War: Timeline of Tony Blair’s Role”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/8272699/Iraq-War-timeline-
of-Tony-Blairs-role.html, accessed on 6 April 2014.
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the UK government does not commit acts 
of terror if it is an act committed by itself 
(this is regardless whatever the act may 
be). However, such a proposal would also 
legitimize Libya’s actions21 or even the Bali 
Bombing and the 9/11 Incident as well if the 
allegations was true that they were inside 
jobs.22
In the international law regime, the 
determining factor may be the element 
of ‘manifest violation of the UN Charter’ 
which will be explained later. However, the 
aforementioned analysis has given some 
examples how acts of terror can be attributable 
to states (and therefore, state actors), and thus 
possibly satisfying one requirement of the 
Crime of Aggression.
2) Gaps in the Law: Eluding Capture
It may seem that State acts of terror 
in form of aggression might easily “check 
the boxes” of the Elements of Crime of 
Aggression. However, the fact that such act is 
committed by States would present different 
kinds of challenges. 
The fact that the ICC relies on 
the cooperation of States to surrender 
the suspects is a problem in itself.23 The 
“leadership requirement” suggests that the 
crime can only be committed by high state 
officials, who are not known to be fond of 
surrendering. For example, Omar Al Bashir 
who is also protected by other States during 
visits (not for aggression, but example of 
head of State refusing to surrender despite 
ICC arrest warrant).24 
Further, heads of States enjoy 
immunity from criminal jurisdictions from 
customary international law,25 despite claims 
of exception for perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of international law.26 The 
ICCSt seems to dismiss immunity in Article 
27, but gives leeway in other places.
The USA, invoking Article 98 of the 
ICCSt, up to December 2006 has signed 
over one hundred agreements with other 
states to not surrender persons to the ICC –
including forty six ICC State Parties.27 They 
even withdrew financial aid from twenty 
four ICC State Parties who refused to sign 
these agreements.28 This is because the USA 
officials are afraid of prosecutions,29 which 
is a well-founded fear (e.g. Iraqi invasion, 
and torture to Iraqi prisoners).30 The ICC has 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the 
territory of State Parties31 so the USA is not 
entirely safe by not being a member. 
Bearing this in mind, some states 
signing the bilateral agreements are State 
Parties to the ICC. Certainly, if these kinds of 
agreements are made between State Parties, 
21 Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, Op.cit., p.523.
22 Bali Bombing: Centre for Research on Globalization, “US-Australia Coverup: Was Al-Qaeda Behind the 2002 Bali Bombing?”, http://www.
globalresearch.ca/us-australia-coverup-was-al-qaeda-behind-the-2002-bali-bombing/5307992 ,  accessed on 6 April 2014. See also 9/11: 
Dailymail, “Fury as Academics Claim 9/11 was ‘Inside Job’”, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-403757/Fury-academics-claim-9-11-
inside-job.html,  accessed on 6 April 2014.
23 Part 6 of the ICCSt.
24 Human Rights Watch, “Chad: Don’t Welcome Back Al-Bashir”, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/09/chad-don-t-welcome-back-al-bashir, 
accessed on 10 April 2014.
25 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3.
26 Ibid, dissenting opinions of Judge Khasawneh and Judge Ad-Hoc Van den Wyngaert.
27 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements”, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_
BIAstatus_current.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2014.
28 Ibid
29 Paul C. Szasz, “The United States Should Join the International Criminal Court”, US Air Force Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, 1998-1999, 
p.13.
30 Dailymail, “British Forces ‘Witnessed Electric Shocks, Beatings, and Dog Kennel Torture of Iraqi Prisoners in Secret US Prison in Baghdad”, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2302646/British-forces-witnessed-torture-Iraqi-prisoners-secret-US-prison-Baghdad.html, accessed 
on 10 April 2014.
31 Article 12(2)(a) of the ICCSt.
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then such agreements are incompatible 
with the object and purpose32 as well as 
these States” obligations under the ICCSt.33 
However, if such an agreement was concluded 
between a State Party and a non-State Party, 
provisions of the ICCSt cannot apply to that 
non-State.34 
b. De Facto Control
Complication rises regarding persons 
with de facto control despite absence of de 
jure position, since the wording of the said 
provision focuses on actual effective control 
rather than that of formal capacity.35 There 
are groups labelled as terrorists who are not 
within the formal structure of a State, but 
informally part of it. The ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility 2001 (Draft Articles) Article 
5-9 and 11 gives a set of actions attributable 
to state despite not conducted by state organs. 
But can the leaders of such terrorists groups 
be charged with Crimes of Aggression? 
1) Two Extremes Same Verdict: 
Ezzeddeen al-Qassam Brigades 
(EQB) and AQ
An example is Mohammed Deif, the 
current leader of EQB of Palestine. This 
group, declared as a terrorist group by some 
other countries e.g. the USA,36 is a military 
wing of Hamas.37 However, they have their 
own structure, leadership, and generally 
independent in planning.38 Hamas, governing 
the Gaza Strip,39 is an important political 
entity in Palestine.40 Therefore, the complicity 
in aim and support would classify actions of 
EQB as an act attributable to a State as per 
Article 11 of the Draft Articles. This can 
fit the EQB in the category of “[...] armed 
bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force [...]” 
in the ICCSt.41 That same provision also 
stipulates “[…] to amount to the acts listed 
above […]”, while the EQB (in consonant 
with Hamas) have been noted to conduct 
many attacks including suicide bombings 
against Israeli civilians and military targets42 
possibly amounting to an act of aggression 
as per Article 8bis(2)(b). While the acts of 
EQB can be attributable to Palestine, would 
Muhammad Deif (as a non-State actor) be 
liable for the Crime of Aggression?
If discussed in the context of the 
previous subsection on de jure control, the 
case may (to some extent) be analogous 
the Lockerbie by drawing possible 
responsibilities between the acts of EQB and 
Ismail Haniyeh –Gaza Prime Minister and 
Leader of Hamas. It may be more elusive, 
since the acts of EQB have some degree of 
independence from Hamas but still EQB’s 
acts are attributable to Palestine as per Article 
11 of the Draft Articles.
Article 8bis(2)(g) does provide the 
possibility for non-state (irregular) armed 
groups to commit an act of aggression when 
they are sent by or on behalf of the state. 
However, Gillet argued that the leaders of 
32 Preamble paras 4 and 5 of the ICCSt.
33 Article 89(1) of the ICCSt.
34 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
35 Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWG) of 2009, Para. 25.
36 US Department of State: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004”, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/45313.pdf, accessed on 6 April 2014.
37 Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades Official Website, “About Us”, http://www.qassam.ps/aboutus.html, accessed on 6 April 2014.
38 Ilana Kass and Bard O’Neil. 1997, The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process: The Deadly Embrace, University 
of America Press, Maryland,  p.267.
39 Hurriyet Daily News, “Hamas Announces Cabinet Reshuffle in Gaza”, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hamas-announces-cabinet-
reshuffle-in-gaza.aspx?pageID=238&nID=29198&NewsCatID=352, accessed on 6 April 2014.
40 Al Arabiya, “Fatah, Hamas Agree to Form Palestine Unity Government”, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/15/
Fatah-Hamas-agree-to-form-Palestinian-unity-government.html, accessed on 6 April 2014.
41 Article 8bis(2)(g) of the ICCSt.
42 US Department of State: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Loc.cit.
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these non-State armed groups cannot be 
liable, because the requirement is for the 
leader to “[…] exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a 
State […]”,43 and to include these non-State 
group leaders would require an amendment 
to that provision to include “[…] or non-State 
actor [...]”.44 
There is some truth in Gillet’s 
argument. If we refer to the SWG report in 
2009, it gives an example of the ‘Industrialists’ 
to describe a non-State actor committing 
a Crime of Aggression45 citing the Farben 
Case46 and Von Leeb Case,47 essentially 
opens the possibilities of private economic 
actors committing aggression, provided they 
had: knowledge, ability to shape or influence 
the policy, and to act in furtherance of the 
policy.48 This case law is a reference of a non-
State actor but the Act of Aggression was still 
a military action of a State.
However Gillet’s argument may sound 
weaker in context of EQB. To understand 
this, we will need to first look at the AQ in 
the 9/11 Incident which Gillet used as ground 
example for his analysis.
The 9/11 Incident was an attack to the 
USA by foreign nationals.49 The UNSC issued 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 mentioning that 
such acts of terror triggers the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence. 
Deducing from Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
this particular terrorist attack is declared as 
an armed attack.
The USA invasion to Afghanistan 
treated both the Taliban regime and AQ 
alike,50 but the Taliban has no links to AQ. 
The Taliban does not support or endorse the 
goals of AQ in calling for and conducting 
international terrorism,51 but refused to 
surrender Osama bin Laden (OBL) simply due 
to customs of being a good host.52 Therefore, 
while the 9/11 incident may amount to an act 
of aggression, it is not a Crime of Aggression 
because: (1) not attributable to a State, and 
(2) OBL also has no control over Afghanistan 
military.53
However, Gillets argument works in a 
hypothetical situation where Taliban can be 
proven to have sufficient control over AQ 
(maybe leader of Taliban can be charged with 
Crimes of Aggression, but not OBL).54 This 
may, be analogous to the situation of EQB. 
But does the EQB count as “state military 
power”? If it does, then Mohammed Deif 
can commit Crime of Aggression. However, 
it will then be an example more distinct to 
the AQ and Taliban, and might fall under 
the previous subsection on de jure control 
instead.
Article 43(1) of the Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions 1949 (1977), 
consonant with customary international 
law, sees that an armed force includes all 
organized armed groups under command of 
43 Article 8bis(1) of the ICCSt, with emphasis added.
44 Mathew Gillet, Op.cit., pp.839-840
45 Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWG) of 2009, Ibid.
46 USA v. Krauch, et al., Trial Judgment, Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1952).
47 USA v. von Leeb, et al., Trial Judgment, Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1950).
48 Von Leeb Case at paras 488-489, and Farben Case at paras 1108
49 The 9/11 Commission, “The 9/11 Commission Report”, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf, accessed on 6 April 2014.
50 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, “Separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan”. http://cic.es.its.
nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf, accessed on 6 April 2014.
51 Ibid, see also: Simon Franzen, “Unity in Terrorism: the Relationship Between Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Militants in Pakistan”, http://instmed.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Al-Qaeda-and-the-Taliban.pdf, accessed on 6 April 2014.
52 Ibid, p.5. 
53 Mathew Gillet, Op.cit, p. 839
54 Ibid, pp. 839-840.
55 Louis Doswald-Beck, and Jean-Marie Haenckarts, 2005, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol I: Rules, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp.14-15.
135Muhammadin, Terrorism and the Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute
a party including both regular and irregular 
groups.55 The facts become murkier since 
Palestine does not even have an actual 
organized army,56 so technically all fighting 
forces of Palestine (Hamas, EQB, Islamic 
Jihad, etc) are irregular forces anyways.
However, the language of Article 
8bis(2) seems to make a distinction between 
provisions relating acts by “armed forces” (in 
Article 8bis(2)(a)-(f)) and “irregular armed 
forces” (in Article 8bis(2)(g)). Therefore 
the EQB is a military group that operates 
to some degree of relation to Hamas as a 
resistance group, but not with the Palestinian 
Government. Muhammad Deif therefore 
cannot be charged with the Crimes of 
Aggression. It is Ismail Haniyeh who might 
be prosecuted for EQB’s acts, but only if he 
commanded it.
In case of AQ, can we agree with Gillet 
that OBL cannot be held liable for the 9/11 
Incident even if the Taliban had control over 
AQ? This depends on the relation between the 
Taliban, AQ, and OBL. If the AQ is a Taliban 
subordinate, then it is true that OBL cannot 
be held accountable for the 9/11 Incident. 
Instead, Mohammed Omar (Taliban leader) 
might be prosecuted for it if he ordered the 
attack – which he didn’t.57 
However if the OBL was respected 
enough to actually be part of the Taliban high 
command and governance of Afghanistan 
at that time and de facto satisfying the 
“leadership” requirement, then he could be 
charged with the Crime of Aggression. 
2) Gap in Law: Silence of International 
Instruments
There have been prosecutions 
undergone in domestic courts for the suspects 
related to the 9/11 incident, among them is the 
trial of Zacarias Moussaoui.58 The first (out of 
six) counts to Moussaoui is the closest similar 
to the Crime of Aggression (trans-boundary 
terrorism),59 but that is stretching too far. 
There has been no indictment against these 
terrorists for an actual Crime of Aggression.
On the international level, these terrorist 
acts may classify as crime against humanity 
in form of “murder”,60 “persecution”61 (the 
AQ declare to target Christians and Jews)62 
and “other inhumane acts” (explained in 
the next section).63 There is no requirement 
for the perpetrator to be a State actor, and 
the element of “widespread or systematic” 
is alternative and not conjunctive.64 The 
“widespread” element means “[...] massive, 
frequent, large scale action, carried out 
collectively with considerable seriousness 
and directed against a multiplicity of victims 
[...]”65 The magnitude of 9/11 is very serious 
(explained in the next section), and AQ 
also committed numerous others attacks 
including the first World Trade Center attack 
(1993), etc.66 The element of “systematic” is 
the organized nature of the acts of violence67 
including political objective,68 which AQ has.
56 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Palestine Forces: Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060209_
palestforces.pdf, accessed on 7 April 2014.
57 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, Loc.cit.
58 USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Judgment, Eastern District of Virginia, United States District Court (2006).
59 Ibid.
60 Article 7(1)(a) of the ICCSt.
61 Article 7(1)(h) of the ICCSt.
62 Osama bin Laden, et al., “Nass Bayan al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li-Jihad al-Yahud wa-al-Salibiyin”, http://www.library.cornell.edu/
colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm, accessed on 10 April 2014.
63 Article 7(1)(k) of the ICCSt.
64 Article 7(1) of the ICCSt.
65 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgment, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1998), para 580.
66 CBN News. “Al Qaida Timeline: Plots and Attacks”, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4677978/ns/world_news-hunt_for_al_qaida/t/al-qaida-
timeline-plots-attacks/#.U0bI4PldWSo, accessed on 10 April 2014.
67 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeals Judgment, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2002), para 94.
68 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Trial Judgment, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2000), para 203. 
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However, if their attacks indeed 
amount to acts of aggression other than 
“only” crimes against humanity, then merely 
prosecuting the latter is not enough. It is not 
impossible for one act to constitute two (or 
more) separate crimes, and pursuing only one 
is insufficient for justice and doesn’t reflect 
the extent of the defendant’s culpability.69 
Therefore, the inability of the ICC to bring 
these terrorist groups to justice for the acts of 
aggression is a gap, leaving only the national 
law system to deal with it. 
Even then, not all national laws can 
capture the “aggressio” character of these 
kinds of attacks. In UK and Indonesian law,70 
there are no provisions that talk specifically 
about trans-boundary acts of terrorism. The 
Crime of Aggression is not a punishable 
offense either in those national laws, so 
there is a gap leaving the acts of terrorism by 
aggression unpunished.
3. “Manifest Violation of the UN Charter” 
Requirement
“[…] by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.”,71 also the fifth element of the 
Crime of Aggression according to the ICC Elements 
of Crime, brings difficulties. 
Gillet describes the ‘character’ component of 
the aggression as the motivation behind the attack, 
which may affect the lawfulness of the act.72 Certain 
motives may preclude unlawfulness, such as an act 
of self-defence.73 
The “scale” component would refer to the 
magnitude of the aggression by means used by the 
aggressor, e.g. number of force, used weaponry, 
duration, etc.74 In this component, there would be a 
difference in viewing a full scale military invasion 
towards Iraq75 and two Russian fighter jets ‘passing 
through’ Japan.76
The final component, “gravity”, is the extent of 
destruction and damage caused by the aggression.77 
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) considers 
this as well generally in determining “gravity of 
crime”.78 Further, the OTP declared that a relatively 
small number of victims is would not satisfy the 
“gravity” requirement despite the strong indication 
of a crime under the ICC jurisdiction.79
Especially in context of the act of aggression, 
this overlap would seem to meet common sense as 
a larger scale of attack may necessarily result in 
greater destruction. Although it is not impossible 
either for a large scale aggression to result in low 
or even zero destruction, such as the recent Russian 
invasion to Ukraine with a heavily armed force of 
around twenty five thousand soldiers.80 After all, 
the act of aggression does not necessarily have to 
include an “attack” (see Article 8bis[2][a], “The 
invasion or attack…”).81
Bear in mind also a conjunctive “and” is 
used in this requirement, as emphasized in Point 
7, Annex III of Resolution RC/Res.6 (2010). Can 
terrorist attacks fulfil these components?
a. Terrorism by Non-State Actors
The 9/11 Incident might display itself 
as an example of a terrorist attack that does 
fulfil all components. There is no question on 
the scale and gravity of attack that destroyed 
69 Ayyash, et al., Submission of Amicus Curiae before the Appeals Chamber, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2011), para 2.
70 Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan, Loc.cit.
71 Article 8bis(1) of the ICCSt.
72 Mathew Gillet, Op.cit.,  p. 859.
73 Article 51 of the UN Charter.
74 Mathew Gillet, Loc.cit.
75 Ibid.
76 BBC. “Russian Fighter Jets ‘Breach Japan Airspace’”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21364559, accessed on 8 April 2014.
77 Mathew Gillet, Loc.cit.
78 Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice, 2007, ICC Office of the Prosecutor, p. 5.
79 Response to Communications Received Concerning Iraq, 2006, ICC Office of the Prosecutor, pp. 8-9.
80 CNN, “Ukraine Looks for ‘Sign of Hope’ from Russia Over Crimea”, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/ukraine-russia-
tensions/, accessed on 8 April 2014.
81 Emphasis added.
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the WTC, killing almost three thousands and 
injuring many more.82 There is no question on 
the character of the attack either, OBL clearly 
intended to attack the USA using revenge and 
religion as excuses.83 The magnitude of the 
incident was such that the UNSC declared 
it an act of aggression that triggers rights to 
self-defence.84
In case of EQB, they do not seem to 
satisfy the components. While the rocket 
attacks to Israel territory during non-clash 
times may be illegal act, but armed violence 
has been there for a long time. Bearing in mind 
the situation of Gaza and Israel in general and 
not to mention the history of the conflict85 
(without implying any legality of the rocket 
attacks under IHL), it is more difficult to 
actually conclude it as an act of aggression 
rather than part of an ongoing armed conflict 
(jus in bello applies).86 Having that said, the 
character itself may be questionable since it 
might not be a breach of jus ad bellum. 
The scale and gravity of attacks as well 
are minimal, as the rocket attacks to Israel 
territory since 2001 have “only” resulted in 
64 deaths (average of 4.9 deaths per year until 
March 2014), with a majority of instances 
reported without any victims or casualties.87 
These kinds of “minor incursions” with 
very minimum impact are usually termed as 
“measures short of war”.88 Without implying 
the legality of such acts, this is something 
lesser in scale and gravity as compared to 
what one would usually refer to as “war”.89 
This is the collective attack from the entire 
Gaza, while the EQB is just one group among 
so many others (it is unclear which of the 
attacks are actually carried out by the EQB). 
Therefore it is not difficult to see that at least 
the scale and gravity of the attacks by the 
EQB would not satisfy a severity that would 
fall under the ICCSt’s requirement.
However, a different way of reading 
the situation may result in more difficult 
considerations. The impacts of these rocket 
attacks from Gaza go beyond physical 
damage. These rocket attacks were meant to 
terrorize and bring fear to the Israeli civilians 
surrounding Gaza,90 which studies have 
shown to cause concrete implications such 
as an increase in Post Traumatic Syndrome 
Disorder91 and miscarriages.92
It has been mentioned that creating 
terror and fear is a subjective element of 
terrorism. In fact, as the name ‘terrorism’ 
suggests, the subjective element may exactly 
be the main point. The rising of such a climate 
may, to some extent, amount to a deprivation 
of fundamental human rights. This could be 
seen in: The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 (UNDHR) in the preamble 
para 2 and Article 3, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966 (ICCPR) in the preamble para 4 and 
Article 9(1). Causing such deprivation of 
rights might classify as a crime against 
humanity, in form of “other inhumane acts” 
which can basically be a deprivation of 
82 The 9/11 Commission, Op.cit., pp. 285-311
83 CBCNews, “Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11”, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/bin-laden-claims-responsibility-for-9-11-1.513654, 
accessed on 8 April 2014. See also Simon Franzen, Loc.cit.
84 UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001).
85 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, No. A/HRC/12/48 (2009), p. 408.
86 Ibid, p.159; and applicability of IHL since the start of armed conflict (ICTY: Tadić Trial Judgement, IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) para 561.)
87 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Rocket fire from Gaza and Palestinian ceasefire violations after Operation Cast Lead”, http://www.mfa.gov.
il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/pages/palestinian_ceasefire_violations_since_end_operation_cast_lead.aspx, accessed on 9 April 2014.
88 Josef Mrázek, “Armed Conflicts and the Use of Force”, Czech Yearbook of international Law, Vol. 1, November, 2010, p. 101.
89 Ibid.
90 Human Rights Council, Op.cit., p. 32.
91 Haaretz, “Almost Half of Sderot Preteens Show Symptoms of PTSD”, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-survey-
almost-half-of-sderot-preteens-show-symptoms-of-ptsd.premium-1.479113, accessed on 9 April 2014.
92 Jerusalem Post, “Report: Missiles in Sderot Increase Miscarriages”, http://www.jpost.com/Health-and-Science/Report-Missiles-on-Sderot-
increase-miscarriages, accessed on 9 April 2014.
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human rights in ICCPR and UNDHR (along 
with other elements inter alia widespread or 
systematic attack as mentioned in previous 
section).93
However, while acts of terrorism can 
possibly classify as a crime against humanity, 
the real question is this: can this “terror-
effect” of EQB attacks contribute to the scale 
and gravity of the act thus making it an act of 
aggression? 
Despite popular view that might 
consider the “terror-effect”, there is no clear 
basis to draw such conclusion. Some reading 
towards Articles 8bis(1) and 17(1)(d) of the 
ICCSt may suggest that the measurements 
can be beyond direct physical destruction. 
McDougal suggested geopolitical concerns 
to indicate the extent of the implications 
of a certain act of aggression,94 such as an 
execution of the President of another State 
by a three man team –a small scale attack 
but can have big geopolitical implications.95 
‘Fear’ has been an element that is not new to 
war, but traditionally it is seen as an element 
of refugee status.96 It is the stream of refugees 
that is generally seen as one of the indicators 
of the gravity of a conflict97 –not the actual 
fear itself. 
To be fair, the 9/11 Incident did change 
the world and how it views international 
terrorism.98 It even changed a major part of 
international law when it triggered the UNSC 
to do unprecedented acts (legislates binding 
rules for all States,99 etc). However, the actual 
scale of the 9/11 Incident perhaps explains 
how such reactions have occurred. The 
gravity of the physical damage alone may be 
seen as extreme in itself, and not to mention 
the fear that spread afterwards.
However, to imply that this ‘terror-
effect’ can be assumed to directly escalate 
the level of gravity of other (lesser) terrorism 
incidents, like the acts of the EQB, it may 
be too far. This may serve as possible 
development of the law, but in international 
criminal law what is relevant is only the 
law as it is (see: Article 22[2] of the ICCSt). 
Therefore, using the law as it is, this fear 
cannot (yet) be accounted into the gravity 
towards an act of aggression.
On another level, even if we assume 
that the “terror-effect” does contribute to 
the gravity, a second problem is present: 
scale. While the gravity is increased by the 
said “terror-effect”, the attack still remains 
as small scale attacks. Bearing in mind 
that “character”, “scale”, and “gravity” are 
conjunctive components, the requirements 
are not satisfied. This is similar to McDougal’s 
president execution example as well since 
the gravity may be large but the scale of 
attack remains small.100 In case of the EQB, 
even if the terror caused to the surrounding 
Israeli territories escalate the gravity of the 
situation, yet the scale of attack remains as 
a series of occasional small rocket attacks 
causing insignificant damage.
b. Terrorism by State Actors
It has been explained in the previous 
section how States can do certain manoeuvers 
93 Kupreskic Trial Judgement, before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2000), para 566.
94 Carrie McDougal, 2013, The Crime of Aggression Under the ICCSt of the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, p. 128.
95 Ibid.
96 Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951).
97 Christine Bell, “Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements”, http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/22/128_report_en.pdf, 
accessed 24 July 2014.
98 Vincent-Joel Proulx, “Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism 
Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?” American University International Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 5, 2004, p. 1025.
99 Resolution 1373 (2001), see also: Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, 2007, The Making of International Law, Oxford University Press, New 
York,  pp. 7-8.
100 Carrie McDougal, Loc.cit.
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to elude themselves from responsibility for 
acts of aggression, which can be as blunt 
as simply refusing to surrender until more 
“legal” ways such as the USA bilateral 
agreements. There are also other gaps in the 
law at the ‘manifest violation’ test which State 
actors can play with to elude themselves from 
responsibility.
Previously, McDougal has shown 
an example of acts of aggression by states 
(president execution) which do not rise to 
Crime of Aggression due to lack in scale 
despite impact. This is also something that 
is available for States to ‘manage’ in order 
to elude themselves from responsibility. A 
possible example to that is the alleged USA 
involvement in terrorist attacks to influence 
the politics in Italy, aiming to halt the leftist 
party in the 1970s (allegedly, as this matter 
has yet to be properly investigated).101 Even 
if this attack were to be attributed to the USA, 
it could hardly satisfy the ‘gravity’ criteria as 
the victims were only sixteen people.102
However, the gap in the ‘character’ is 
unique to States, as they would require special 
international fora to utilize. This particular 
component, when faced with the threshold 
(i.e. manifest violation of the UN Charter) 
will find ways to be eluded. It has been 
explained how the component of ‘character’ 
is a question of motive, whether or not the use 
of force was justified. The example that was 
used earlier was acts of self-defence which is 
justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
The UNSC would have a big role in 
this matter, since the act of aggression is 
a breach of peace while the UNSC has a 
role of maintaining international peace and 
security.103 Under Article 42 of the UN Charter, 
the UNSC can utilize force or authorize the 
use of force. It is generally understood that 
this kind of use of force is consistent with the 
UN Charter, as Article 42 is under Chapter 
VII which may circumvent the prohibition 
against the use of force as per Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter. A UNSC Resolution can 
therefore preclude a particular act that would 
normally classify as an act of aggression, 
into a proper and legal motivation and thus 
not satisfying the ‘character’ component. An 
example to this would be the first invasion to 
Iraq in 1991, which was authorized by UNSC 
Resolution No. 678 (1990).104
On the other hand, the UNSC can also 
declare a particular use of force as illegal. An 
example to that would be the Iraq invasion to 
Kuwait in 1990, which the UNSC declared 
its illegality through UNSC Resolutions 660 
and 661 (both in 1990). When there is such 
declaration of illegality, certainly there is big 
evidence that the “character” component is 
satisfied to be a “manifest breach of the UN 
Charter”. 
However, what happens in absence of 
a UNSC explicit approval/condemning is a 
more elusive. It is not impossible for certain 
states to commit acts that might ordinarily 
amount to an act of aggression, but the UNSC 
does not issue any resolution –not because it 
did not really amount to a threat but because 
of the veto. An example to this is, again, the 
2003 Iraq invasion.
The legality of this invasion was very 
dubious. The USA and UK armies relied 
on past UNSC Resolution 678 (1990), 
claiming that the conditions for authorization 
101 The Guardian, “Terrorists ‘Helped by CIA’ to Stop Rise of Left in Italy”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/26/terrorism, 
accessed on 11 April 2004, for other alleged inter-State ‘terrorist operations’ by the USA see also: Centre for Research on Globalization, 
“America Is Running the World Largest Terrorist Operation”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-is-running-the-worlds-largest-terrorist-
operation/5339835, accessed on 12 April 2014.
102 Ibid.
103 Article 24(1) of the UN Charter.
104 John Yoo, “International Law and the War in Iraq”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, July, 2003, p. 564.
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of authorization of the use of force against 
Iraq was somewhat ‘relived’.105 Resolution 
678 (1990) gives authority to use force if 
Iraq fails to fulfil the cease-fire provisions, 
and Iraq did so then USA and UK sent their 
forces in 1991.106 Now that in 2002-2003 Iraq 
is allegedly breaching that same ‘cease-fire 
provision’ (specifically the disarmament and 
weapons inspection requirement),107 the USA 
and UK attacked again based on the same 
Resolution 678.
One on hand, the argument that USA 
and UK submitted was based on a UNSC 
Resolution which, as aforementioned, may 
preclude the unlawfulness of the use of 
force if the argument were accepted. Not to 
mention, this invasion was not condemned by 
the UNSC. 
On the other hand, Resolution 678 
(1990) was made in the context of the Iraq 
invasion to Kuwait. Therefore, it should be a 
whole different context for 2003 that does not 
at all involve Kuwait. Further, a proposal for 
an authorization was attempted but withdrawn 
as it would have only secured four votes in 
the UNSC.108 A number of UNGA members 
were also invited to the UNSC to give their 
views, which an overwhelming majority of 
them stating that there is no actual threat to 
international peace and security to justify 
any form of military action towards Iraq.109 
It is also inconceivable for the UNSC to even 
think of passing a resolution to condemn the 
Iraq invasion, since both main actors of that 
invasion (USA and UK) has veto rights.
An argument of anticipatory self-
defence was also submitted by the USA 
and UK, which has to be proven ‘instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation’, as required 
in the Caroline Test.110 Arguing against this 
claim, it has already been mentioned how 
there is an overwhelming number of states 
from the UNGA and UNSC disagreeing to 
the state of such threat towards international 
peace and security.
However, no matter how overwhelming 
one side of the argument may seem, even 
scholars who argue against the legality of the 
Iraq invasion admits that the arguments for 
the legality cannot be fully dismissed.111 This 
is while Article 8bis(1) requires the violation 
of UN Charter to be ‘manifest’. Therefore, 
it is not impossible that these manoeuvers 
are used by certain States to get away with 
terrorism in form of aggression. This is 
especially true for States who have veto rights 
to render UNSC Resolutions impossible 
to declare an authoritative unlawfulness of 
certain actions.
C. Conclusion
Exploring the connection between terrorism 
and aggression reveals a number of things. The 
first is the fact that it is not impossible for States to 
commit acts of terror in form of aggression. 
The 2003 invasion Iraq may serve as an 
elusive example, but it is not entirely irrelevant to 
discuss terrorism by State with current definitions 
being so broad. This kind of terrorism may very 
well generally fall under the Crime of Aggression to 
some extent, however there are gaps in the law that 
certain States can exploit to avoid responsibilities. 
These gaps are: the element of “manifest violation 
105 Mathew Gillet, Op.cit. 
106 Ibid
107 Loc.cit, p. 848.
108 The Guardian, “Ten Days to War”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/08/iraq.unitednations, accessed on 12 April 2014.
109 Alex Bellamy, “International Law and the War in Iraq”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, No.2, 2003, p. 519
110 Keith Petty, “Criminalizing Force: Resolving the Threshold Question for the Crime of Aggression in the Context of Modern Conflict”, Seattle 
University Law Review, Vol. 33, 2009, pp. 113-134.
111 Claus Kress, “Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus”, The 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2010, pp.1141-1142. See also, Mathew Gillet, Op.cit., pp. 849-850.
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of the UN Charter” in terms of “characteristic”, as 
well as bilateral agreements under Article 98 of the 
ICCSt. 
The more popular forms of terrorism would 
be by non-State actors such as the AQ. However, 
it is near impossible for these kinds of terrorists to 
be charged with Crimes of Aggression especially 
on the ‘leadership’ requirement. Further, the ‘scale’ 
and ‘gravity’ components of the ‘manifest violation 
of the UN Charter’ element are also hard to fulfil. 
Although the acts of terror itself, probably as a 
crime against humanity at best, might be punished. 
However, the ‘act of aggression’ that these terrorists 
commit would remain unpunished, leaving another 
gap in the law from the current reality of what 
terrorists are capable of doing.
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